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SUPRESSING DAMAGES IN 
INVOLUNTARY PARENTHOOD 
ACTIONS: CONTORTING TORT LAW, 
DENYING REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 





Abstract: “Involuntary parenthood” actions are negligence 
actions, usually medical malpractice cases involving a failed 
sterilization, inadequate warning about the risks of pregnancy, 
or a failed abortion. In Canada, they will soon also involve 
product liability claims against negligent birth control 
manufacturers, providers and regulators. This article considers 
whether the parents’ damages ought to include the cost of 
raising the child. No Canadian appellate court has ever ruled 
on this point, although it has been adjudicated extensively by 
the highest courts elsewhere in the common law world. At least 
7 different rules limiting such recovery have been endorsed in 
the Canadian lower courts. Most of the limiting rules are 
unique to involuntary parenthood cases, deviating from the 
outcome that would prevail were the standard rules of 
negligence law applied. Many have no rational foundation. 
This article concludes that the failure to compensate parents 
for the cost of raising the child cannot be justified. Rather the 
refusal to compensate for reasonable child rearing expenses 
constitutes discrimination against parents, especially women 
who are mothers. This discrimination is sometimes, perhaps 
often, perpetrated by judges who refuse to accept and protect a 
woman’s right to reproductive freedom. These mothers are 
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under-compensated, and the medical establishment that failed 




This article deals with the ambiguous and unsettled state of 
Canadian tort law in cases of “involuntary parenthood.” More 
specifically, it concentrates on the various and inconsistent 
rules regarding whether parents may recover for the cost of 
rearing a child born of an involuntary pregnancy; if so, on what 
basis and to what extent; and if not, why not.  
 
The scope of recoverable damages for “involuntary 
parenthood” has generated many controversial judicial 
decisions from the highest courts in the common law world.1 
Yet the issue has not been ruled on by a single Canadian 
appellate court outside Quebec, let alone considered by the 
Supreme Court of Canada.2 This is probably about to change. 
Several Canadian law firms have launched class actions 
relating to a problem with Alysena birth control pills. Product 
lots containing extra placebo pills in place of active pills 
                                                
1  In the past 15 years, there have been two decisions from the UKHL: 
McFarlane v Tayside Health Board, [2000] 2 AC 59, [1999] 4 All ER 
961 [McFarlane]; and Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS 
Trust, [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 [Rees]. There has been one 
from the High Court of Australia where the majority rejects the 
holding in both UK cases: Cattanach v Melchior, [2003] HCA 38, 
(2003), 199 ALR 131 [Cattanach]. There has been lively debate 
among in the judges in each case.  
2  Nor has there been a flood of reported trial decisions. Possibly the 
stakes have been too low to support the cost of appellate litigation. 
Only a few cases have awarded damages for the cost of raising a 
healthy child, and if they did, at present an award of $150,000 for the 
cost of rearing the child would be considered generous. See infra note 
98.  
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reached the market. Involuntary births may have resulted.3 
Suddenly, settling the parameters for damages in involuntary 
parenthood cases has become a pressing question. 
 
Involuntary parenthood cases include cases that have 
been traditionally described as either “wrongful pregnancy” or 
“wrongful birth” cases. In Kealey v. Berezowski, Lax J 
explained the distinction between “wrongful birth” and 
“wrongful pregnancy” cases as follows:4  
 
In a wrongful pregnancy case the act is always 
pre-conception. The claimants are parents who 
allege that the defendant's negligence has caused 
an unwanted pregnancy and birth. The 
negligence often occurs through a failed 
sterilization or through the preparation or 
dispensing of a contraceptive medication. The 
claim has been advanced for children born 
healthy and for those born unhealthy. In either 
case, the child is unplanned. Courts have 
recognized the viability of this claim which may 
be advanced in contract or tort, although it is 
more usually advanced in tort. Courts have 
diverged on the appropriate measure of 
damages. 
 
A "wrongful birth" case normally arises in an 
action instituted by parents of a child who is 
                                                
3  See Alysena Birth Control/Apotex Inc. Class Action, online: Watkins 
Law Professional Corporation <http://www.watkinslawforthe 
people.com>; and Alysena Birth Control Class Action, online: 
Merchant Law Group LLP <https://www.merchantlaw.com>. This 
author has done some consulting on one of these files with a 
plaintiffs’ firm.  
4  Kealey v Berezowski, [1996] OJ No 2460, 30 OR (3d) 37 [Kealey] at 
para 37-38. 
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born with birth defects as a result of a planned 
pregnancy. The legal basis for the cause of 
action derives from the post-conception 
interference by the tortfeasor with the mother's 
lawful right to terminate the pregnancy had an 
informed decision been available to her. 
 
It turns out that these traditional categories are not 
necessary for present purposes. Although these labels are well-
established and descriptively accurate, there is no reason to 
treat the parents’ claims for the cost of child rearing in 
“wrongful pregnancy” cases differently from how such claims 
are treated in the “wrongful birth” cases. The courts do not 
differentiate between them on damage questions. Judges move 
seamlessly from one line of authority to the other when 
reviewing the state of the law. Instead, this article will employ 
Professor Adjin-Tettey’s term, “involuntary parenthood” to 
encompass both “wrongful pregnancy” and “wrongful birth.”5 
 
It is possible, however, that the distinction between 
pre- and post-conception negligence will remain important in 
the entirely different sort of claim for “wrongful life” with 
which the involuntary parenthood claims are often confused. 
“Wrongful life” claims were described in Kealey as follows:6 
 
“Wrongful life” claims . . . are normally 
advanced by the infant plaintiff or on his or her 
behalf and sometimes together with a derivative 
claim by the parents. These claims can arise pre-
                                                
5  See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, “Claims of Involuntary Parenthood: Why 
the Resistance?” in Jason Neyers, Erika Chamberlain & Stephen 
Pitel, eds, Emerging Issues in Tort Law, (Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2007) 85 at 85-6. See generally Dean Stretton, “The Birth Torts: 
Damages for Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life” (2005) 10 Deakin L 
Rev 319. 
6 Kealey, supra note 4 at para 37. 
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conception as in the case of a failed sterilization 
or post-conception as in the case of a failed 
abortion or improper genetic screening. A 
"wrongful life" claim alleges that the tortfeasor, 
invariably a physician, owes a duty of care to the 
child which is breached by the physician's 
failure to give the child's parents the opportunity 
to terminate his or her life.  
 
It is critical to distinguish the parents’ “wrongful 
pregnancy” or “wrongful birth” claims from the child’s own 
claim for “wrongful life.” No Canadian court has ever 
recognized a child’s independent cause of action for “wrongful 
life,” although the question is actively open today, at least in 
Ontario.7 Some of the objections to recognizing a “wrongful 
                                                
7  Claims by a child based on pre-conception negligence have been 
rejected twice in Ontario. See Paxton v Ramji, 2008 ONCA 697, 92 
OR (3d) 401 and Bovingdon v Hergott, 2008 ONCA 2, 88 OR (3d) 
641. The courts preferred to take a standard “novel duty” approach 
rather than to employ the “wrongful life” label and the baggage that 
accompanies that label. In Liebig (Litigation Guardian of) v Guelph 
General Hospital, 2010 ONCA 450, [2010] OJ No 2580 [Liebig] the 
court confirmed that the decisions in Paxton and Bovingdon had not 
altered “. . . the very long and well-established line of cases. . . , 
holding that an infant, once born alive, may sue for damages 
sustained as a result of the negligence of health care providers during 
labour and delivery [emphasis added].” The open question concerns 
cases that arise from the factual circumstances captured by the 
“wrongful birth” cases, but not the “wrongful pregnancy cases” 
where the negligence occurs post-conception, but prior to labour and 
delivery. In McDonald-Wright (Litigation guardian of) v O'Herlihy, 
[2005] OJ No. 1636, 75 OR (3d) 261 such a claim was not struck out, 
but failed on the issue of standard of care. The consequences of 
refusing to allow the child to recover are cushioned in a jurisdiction 
that allows the parents to recover child rearing costs fully, or for 
exceptional child care costs related to a child born with a disability. 
However, the question of whether the parents may recover for care 
expenses expected to be incurred after the child reaches the age of 
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life” claim arise from quantification difficulties similar to those 
raised in the parental clams. However, the two core concerns in 
“wrongful life” are unique to the child’s claim. In Canada 
especially, there is a concern about the possibility that 
conflicting duties of care to the mother and to the child might 
arise if the child’s “wrongful life” claim were recognized.8 
Second, there is a judicial aversion to regarding the birth of a 
child, particularly one’s own birth, as a legal wrong. Neither of 
these concerns applies to “involuntary parenthood” actions 
which deal with the parents’ claims for losses they suffer when 
their rights of “reproductive autonomy” are breached.9 
Nevertheless, one suspects that the failure to distinguish clearly 
the child’s claim for wrongful birth from the parents’ claim for 
involuntary pregnancy has prejudiced the parental plaintiffs. 
 
“Involuntary parenthood” actions are negligence 
actions. To date, the Canadian cases have all been medical 
malpractice cases. The typical involuntary parenthood case has 
involved a failed sterilization, inadequate warning about the 
risks of pregnancy, or a failed abortion.10 There is no logical 
                                                                                           
majority is unsettled. If the parents cannot recover these projected 
post-majority costs, this may be an unmet need for the child. Parents 
were allowed to recover a small percentage of projected care costs 
after the child reached the age of majority in Krangle (Guardian ad 
litem of) v Brisco, [1997] BCJ No 2740, 154 DLR (4th) 707 
[Krangle], approved in Bovingdon at para 85. This was a contingency 
should the child not be placed in publically funded care as expected. 
See also Kealey, supra note 4 at para 98, and Petkovic (Litigation 
guardian of) v Olupona, [2002] OJ No 1269 where a motion to strike 
out a claim by the child for care costs in adulthood was dismissed.  
8  See e.g. Paxton, Bovingdon, & Leibig, ibid.  
9  This term is also used by Adjin-Tettey, supra note 5 at 85. 
10  A comprehensive and detailed breakdown is offered by Sanda 
Rodgers, “A Mother’s Loss Is the Price of Parenthood: The Failure of 
Tort Law to Recognize Birth as Compensable Reproductive Injury” 
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reason why the damage rules for involuntary parenthood 
should be any different in a medical malpractice case than they 
would be in a class action based on a defective product such as 
the one involving Alysena.  
 
There are at least seven different approaches to govern 
the recovery of the cost of rearing the child in an involuntary 
parenthood claim that enjoy some judicial support in Canada.11 
Taking the Australian and UK positions into account, there is 
overwhelming support for allowing the parents to recover for at 
least some costs related directly to the birth and pregnancy 
itself. In addition, most courts favour recovery for special care 
costs related to rearing a child born with a disability. Recent 
cases have allowed at least limited recovery for the cost of 
rearing a healthy child. However, there is no single clear 
position in Canada. Obviously, there must be something special 
about reproductive autonomy to have turned an otherwise 
simple variant of settled medical malpractice law into such a 
jumble.  
 
This article examines and evaluates why so many 
judges refuse to award full compensation for the foreseeable 
cost of rearing a child, whether healthy or born with a 
disability. It examines a series of arguments that have been 
relied upon to defeat or limit the parents’ claims. First, it 
considers the argument that the birth of a child does not 
constitute a compensable loss. It then considers the modified 
position that the birth of a healthy child does not constitute a 
loss, but the birth of a child born with a disability does. Next it 
                                                                                           
(2009) 44 SCLR (2d) 161 at 164-5. See also Adjin-Tettey, supra note 
5 at 86-7. 
11  In Bevilacqua v Altenkirk, 2004 BCSC 945, [2004] BCJ No 1473 
[Bevilacqua], the court identified four such possibilities at paras 84-
87, derived from the three identified in Kealey, supra note 4 at para 
96. See also the five options identified by Kirby J in Cattanach, supra 
note 1 at para 235.  
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 29, 2014] 
 
18 
considers several arguments that purport to accept the full 
recovery model, but in effect collapse into much more 
restrictive positions. Finally, it reviews two highly unusual 
compromise positions – the conventional sum and non-
pecuniary loss approaches. The article will conclude that the 
various refusals to allow or to limit compensation for the cost 
of rearing the child cannot be justified. Parents should be 
permitted to recover damages related to the pregnancy and 
birth itself and also damages for the full costs of raising the 
child whether born healthy or born with a disability. 
Foreseeability of loss should be the governing concept as it is 
in other malpractice cases. This position represents the view of 
the majority of the Australian High Court,12 and has also been 
adopted in New Brunswick.13  
 
                                                
12  Cattanach, supra note 1. The result was subsequently modified by 
legislation in three Australian states, essentially to restrict recovery to 
the extra cost of raising a child born with a disability. The Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 71 prohibits recovery for the cost of 
rearing a healthy child, but allows recovery (except for associated 
loss of earnings) for additional losses associated with raising a child 
born with a disability. The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 49A and 
49B also excludes damages related to the cost of raising a healthy 
child. However, the exclusion only applies to a child born as a result 
of a failed contraceptive or sterilisation procedure (emphasis added), 
not an IVF procedure or antenatal negligence. It may not cover a 
product liability claim based on defective birth control. The Civil 
Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 67 precludes recovery for the costs of 
rearing a healthy child only, and this prohibition also applies to 
product liability claims.  
13  Stockford v Johnston Estate, 2008 NBQB 118, [2008] NBJ No 122 
[Stockford]. See also MS v Baker, 2001 ABQB 1032, [2001] AJ No 
1579. The child had serious health problems for the first five years, 
and was healthy thereafter. The court apparently approved full 
recovery applying the scope of the risk test from Kealey, supra note 
4. This was in obiter because the plaintiff failed to establish 
negligence. 
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NO RECOVERY FOR THE COST OF REARING A 
HEALTHY CHILD 
At one end of the spectrum is the approach that holds that the 
cost of rearing a child is not a compensable head of damages. 
Under this approach both parents14 may recover damages for 
their own losses associated with the pregnancy and childbirth 
itself, such as lost income, out-of-pocket expenses, and medical 
expenses.15 However, nothing is awarded for the cost of raising 
the child. This restriction is usually supported by observations 
about the inherent value of human life and the social 
importance of the family. One Alberta judge, in obiter, has 
                                                
14  The Canadian courts routinely allow the father to recover for his own 
losses relating to the birth and pregnancy itself. The few overt 
challenges to the father’s right to claim have been rejected. See e.g. 
RH v Hunter, [1996] OJ No. 4477 [Hunter] at paras 22 - 31; Krangle, 
supra note 7 at para 117. A stand-alone claim by the father was 
dismissed in Freeman v Sutter, [1996] MJ No 246 (CA), the court 
holding that the father’s claim must be derivative of the mother’s. In 
some jurisdictions the father may be permitted to claim damages for 
loss of consortium. See e.g. Cattanach, supra note 1 where the 
mother claimed all the direct costs related to the pregnancy, the father 
claimed for loss of consortium, and they claimed jointly for the cost 
of raising the child.  
15  An example of what these damages might consist is found in Kealey, 
supra note 4 at para 96: 
  Having regard to the unplanned pregnancy exacerbated by the 
round ligament strain, the stress and difficulty of caring for two 
young children and working full-time during this pregnancy, the 
labour and delivery, and the re-sterilization, all necessitated by 
the defendant's negligence, I award general damages of $30,000.  
 To date there is no clear position about an entitlement to 
damages for opportunity costs incurred by a parent choosing to 
leave the workforce to care for the child.  
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 29, 2014] 
 
20 
expressed a preference for this position.16  
 
The “no recovery” position takes various shapes. Its 
distinguishing feature is the premise, often stated as if it were 
self-evident, that it is wrong for society to award monetary 
damages which attempt to reflect the value/cost of human life. 
In addition to the implicit philosophical and religious bases of 
such a position, some judges offer nothing more than a moral 
hunch to support denying the parents’ claim for the cost of 
rearing the child. The judge may refer to the various ways in 
which the state demonstrates the importance of human life and 
its support for families and child rearing.17 Some judges have 
propped up this argument by observing that such damages 
would be unpopular with the mythical public transit 
passenger.18 Others say the action commodifies the value of the 
child’s life. Still others may go so far as to declare that 
awarding such damages would be repugnant.19 In their pure 
form, these arguments lead to the conclusion that no damages 
whatsoever should be allowed for child-rearing expenses. 
 
In Rees, L Steyn quoted with approval the following 
words of L Millet in McFarlane:20  
                                                
16  MY v Boutros, 2002 ABQB 362, [2002] AJ No 480. The court would 
not have allowed recovery for cost of rearing a healthy child, or 
recovery for the additional exceptional expenses of raising a child 
born with a disability. 
17  See e.g. Kealey, supra note 4 at 62. “The birth of a child is a 
blessing” is a related argument, discussed below under offsetting 
benefits. 
18  See e.g. L Hutton in Rees, supra note 1 at para 89 quoting Lady Hale 
in Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust, 
[2002] QB 266 (CA) [Parkinson]; Kirby J in Cattanach, supra note 1 
at para 135 criticizing L Steyn in Parkinson.  
19  See generally Adjin-Tettey, supra note 5 at 103-109. 
20 L Steyn in Rees supra note 1 at para 28. He went on to say:  
Suppressing Damages in Involuntary Parenthood Actions 21 
In my opinion the law must take the birth of a 
normal, healthy baby to be a blessing, not a 
detriment. In truth it is a mixed blessing. It 
brings joy and sorrow, blessing and 
responsibility. The advantages and the 
disadvantages are inseparable. Individuals may 
choose to regard the balance as unfavourable 
and take steps to forgo the pleasures as well as 
the responsibilities of parenthood. They are 
entitled to decide for themselves where their 
own interests lie. But society itself must regard 
the balance as beneficial. It would be repugnant 
to its own sense of values to do otherwise. It is 
morally offensive to regard a normal, healthy 
baby as more trouble and expense than it is 
worth [Emphasis added by L Steyn]. 
 
The fatal weakness of this line of argument is that there 
is no logical connection between the value of human life as 
society must weigh it (assuming it must), and the parents’ 
medical malpractice claim for pecuniary damages.21 McHugh 
and Gummow JJ put this well in Cattanach:22  
 
First, are the underlying values respecting the 
importance of human life, the stability of the 
                                                                                           
 These I believe to be themes which led the Law Lords sitting in 
the case to reject the claim for the cost of bringing up the healthy 
child (in McFarlane): see Lord Slynn of Hadley, at 75C and 76C; 
my judgment, at 83D-E; Lord Hope of Craighead, at 97C-D; 
Lord Clyde, at 103 B-D; Lord Millett, at 111C-D. 
21  If there is a rational connection, it would be that assisting parents with 
the expenses of child rearing would support, not violate, these 
essential values.  
22  Cattanach, supra note 1 at para 767. See also J K Mason, "A Turn-up 
Down Under: McFarlane in the Light of Cattanach", (2004) 1:1 
SCRIPTed 119. 
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family unit and the nurture of infant children 
until their legal majority an essential aspect of 
the corporate welfare of the community? 
Secondly, if they are, can it be said there is a 
general recognition in the community that those 
values demand that there must be no award of 
damages for the cost to the parents of rearing 
and maintaining a child who would not have 
been born were it not for the negligent failure of 
a gynaecologist in giving advice after 
performing a sterilisation procedure? 
 
Allowing an affirmative answer to the first 
question, nevertheless the answer to the second 
must be that the courts can perceive no such 
general recognition that those in the position of 
Mr. and Mrs. Melchior should be denied the full 
remedies the common law of Australia 
otherwise affords them. It is a beguiling but 
misleading simplicity to invoke the broad values 
which few would deny and then glide to the 
conclusion that they operate to shield the 
appellants from the full consequences in law of 
Dr. Cattanach's negligence. 
 
How can one explain why some judges continue to 
deny the parents’ claim in the absence of a rational connection 
between the trumpeted core values and the parents’ claim? 
Possibly some proponents of the inherent value of life have 
wrongly conflated objections to a child’s wrongful life claim 
with objections to involuntary parenthood claims. Involuntary 
parenthood claims do not value the worth of the child. It is true 
that at the time of the operative negligence, whether pre- or 
post-conception, the mother did not wish to become or remain 
pregnant. The action deals with the consequences to the parents 
of a pregnancy that was unwanted at the time the tort was 
committed. The guiding principle of tort damages is restitutio 
Suppressing Damages in Involuntary Parenthood Actions 23 
in integrum – put the parents in the position they would have 
been in had the tort not been committed. The “had the tort not 
been committed” point of reference arises long before the child 
is born. It is not necessarily true, or even more likely than not 
to be true, that by the time of the birth or afterwards the child is 
an unwanted child. Once the unwanted pregnancy is 
established and accepted as a matter of fact, and certainly once 
the child is born, the child may well be a wanted child. 
Recovery should not depend on whether the child is loved or 
loathed. The wrong is rooted in the damage to the mother’s 
right to reproductive autonomy. There is nothing inherent in 
the “involuntary parenthood” action that requires that the 
parents have an objection of any sort to the child who is 
eventually born. There is nothing about the “involuntary 
parenthood” action that suggests that the parents are seeking 
damages for a “wrongful child.”  
 
The right of a woman, or a woman and her partner 
acting in concert, to make reproductive choices lies at the core 
of the involuntary parenthood action. Lord Bingham put it 
more broadly saying the mother’s interest is “the opportunity to 
live her life in the way that she wished and planned.” 23 The 
involuntary parenthood action deals with the parents’ claim to 
recover pecuniary damages they suffer as the result of 
negligently inflicted damage to their right to reproductive 
autonomy. It is quite possible that the “inherent value of human 
life” rhetoric is simply a device employed to constrain 
reproductive autonomy. There is arguably a rational connection 
between these core values and the background facts of 
involuntary parenthood such as abortion and sterilization. 
Having failed to outlaw reproductive autonomy, this is a line of 
argument that would appeal to judges who wish to constrain it.  
 
In Canada, Australia and the UK, a woman has a right, 
however constrained in practice, to use birth control, to 
                                                
23  Rees, supra note 1 at para 8. 
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undergo sterilization and to undergo an abortion.24 Some 
judges in Australia and the UK have argued that these are not 
“rights,” but merely “freedoms.”25 This can only mean that 
these judges believe that the mother is entitled to consume 
these medical services (the freedom), but has no right to full 
compensation if the medical services are performed 
negligently. There are people who object to the existence and 
exercise of some or all aspects of reproductive autonomy. 
Included among them are judges, some of whom allow their 
objections to influence their judgment in involuntary 
parenthood cases. If they insist on limiting the reproductive 
autonomy of women and families, they should do so explicitly 
and justify their position openly. It is disingenuous to pay lip 
service to reproductive freedom and to simultaneously gut it.26 
 
There are numerous reasons why a woman and her 
partner might wish to prevent pregnancy or birth. They may 
involve health concerns for the mother or the putative child. 
They may involve financial or lifestyle concerns. One partner’s 
reasons may differ from the others. Decisions may be based on 
all these factors and more. Some observers may believe that 
they would have made a different choice in the same 
circumstances. Others may feel the mother’s choice was 
irrational, or repugnant. Provided the exercise of reproductive 
autonomy is lawful, which it should be as part of the right to 
bodily autonomy, the mother is entitled to make it. The law 
should be compelled to respect a woman’s reproductive 
                                                
24  See e.g. Kealey, supra note 4 at para 59; Cattanach, supra note 1 per 
Gleeson CJ at para 3 and 8, and per McHugh & Gummow JJ at para 
66; Rees, supra note 1 per L Bingham at para 8, and per L Millet at 
para 123.  
25  See Cattanach, supra note 1 per Gleeson CJ at para 23; Rees, supra 
note 1 per L Hope at para 70. 
26  For example, contrast the words of Gleeson CJ in Cattanach, supra 
note 1 at paras 3 and 8 with his comment in para 23. 
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autonomy in the same way as it protects bodily autonomy and 
integrity. One entirely foreseeable consequence of the wrong is 
that the parents are now incurring the cost of rearing a child 
that they would not have incurred but for the medical 
negligence. Ordinarily the law of torts would attempt to make 
an award of damages that would put the parents in the position 
they would have been in had the tort not been committed, as far 
as money is able to do so.  
 
The departure from the ordinary rules of negligence 
law is a common characteristic in involuntary parenthood 
cases. Prima facie, negligent defendants ought to be held fully 
liable for all reasonably foreseeable loss to foreseeable 
plaintiffs caused by their negligent breach of their duty of 
care.27 Involuntary parenthood actions are, after all, negligence 
actions that fall within a well-recognized sub-category, medical 
malpractice. The courts may properly determine that the 
ordinary rules of negligence law must be abrogated or modified 
in a particular type of case. However, we should be very wary 
when they do so. The law of negligence is replete with rules 
and exceptions applied in an unjustified and discriminatory 
fashion to the detriment of women and members of minority 
groups.28 Involuntary parenthood actions deal primarily with 
                                                
27  See per L Hutton in Rees, supra note 1 at para 98. See also Adjin-
Tettey, supra note 5 at paras 87, 90, and 92. At para 100 the author 
points out that foreseeability is the rule in other medical malpractice 
cases based on the loss of patient autonomy. The “ambit of the 
wrongdoing” challenge to foreseeability is discussed below. 
28  Adjin-Tettey, supra note 5, effectively employs gender discrimination 
as the lens with which to view the courts’ failure to compensate for 
child rearing costs. She has published other analyses of gender 
discrimination in tort law. See e.g. “Discriminatory Impact of 
Application of Restitutio in Integrum in Personal Injury Claims” in 
Justice Robert Sharpe & Kent Roach, eds, Taking Remedies Seriously 
(Ottawa: CIAJ, 2010) 119; “Sexual Wrongdoing: Do the Remedies 
Reflect the Wrong?” in Janice Richardson & Erika Rackley, eds, 
Feminist Perspectives on Tort Law (New York: Routledge, 2012); 
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the uniquely female aspects of reproductive autonomy and with 
damage inflicted on mothers.29 The refusal to compensate for 
the quantifiable and foreseeable costs of rearing a child 
discriminates against parents, but especially against women 
who are mothers.30 Such discrimination requires a convincing 
justification.  
  
                                                                                           
and “Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities in Personal Injury 
Claims through Female Specific Contingencies” (2004) 49 McGill L 
J 309. See also Rodgers, supra note 10; Bruce Feldthusen, 
"Discriminatory Damage Quantification in Civil Actions for Sexual 
Battery" (1994) 44 UTLJ 133 (failure to recognize pecuniary losses 
suffered by female plaintiffs in civil sexual battery cases); and Bruce 
Feldthusen, “Civil Liability for Sexual Assault in Aboriginal 
Residential Schools: The Baker Did It” (2007) 22 CJLS 61 (failure to 
apply standard rules imposing joint and several liability for 
indivisible harm).  
29  Fathers may also recover, but the father’s claim is derivative of the 
mother’s. See Freeman v Sutter, supra note 14.  
30  Women with children are an especially vulnerable group. See Xuelin 
Zhang, “Earnings of Women With and Without Children” (2009) 
10:3 Perspectives on Labour and Income 5 
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2009103/article/10823-
eng.htm> accessed 6 Aug 2014. Women spend about twice the time 
doing unpaid child care as do men. See Anne Milan, Leslie-Ann 
Keown & Covadonga Robles Urquijo, “Families, Living 
Arrangements and Unpaid Work”, in Statistics Canada, Women in 
Canada: A Gender-based Statistical Report, Catalogue No 89-503-X 
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2011) <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-
503-x/2010001/article/11546-eng.pdf> accessed 6 Aug 2014. 
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ONLY EXCEPTIONAL CARE COSTS ALLOWED FOR 
CHILD BORN WITH A DISABILITY31 
 
A widely favoured exception to the pure “no recovery” position 
allows, in addition to the costs related to the pregnancy itself, 
damages for the extra care costs related to the special needs of 
a child born with a disability. Under this approach, damages for 
the cost of raising a healthy child remain unrecoverable. This 
exceptional treatment in the case of a child born with a 
disability is probably the law in the UK.32 Several Canadian 
courts have supported this position.33 This is also the statutory 
rule in three Australian states.34  
 
The popularity of the disability exception is not 
surprising. The damages claimed are familiar to our legal 
                                                
31  As explained below, the use of terms such as “born with a disability” 
versus “healthy child” is unnecessary and every attempt to avoid this 
terminology has been made herein. The use of the terms “disabled 
child,” and “normal child,” quite common in the UK and Australia 
one assumes from Rees, supra note 1 and Cattanach supra note 1, is 
less common in Canada where it would usually be regarded as 
offensive.  
32  This was the rule established in Parkinson, supra note 18. It appears 
this is still the law in the UK after Rees, supra note 1. This is 
discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 74-81.  
33  Cherry (Guardian ad litem of) v Borsman, [1992] BCJ No 1687, 16 
BCAC 93; Joshi (Guardian ad litem of) v Wooley, [1995] BCJ No 
113, 4 BCLR (3d) 208. Such recovery was approved in Kealey, supra 
note 4, but without necessarily ruling out recovery for the cost of 
raising a healthy child in an appropriate case. See infra notes 42-48 
and accompanying text. The right to recover the cost of exceptional 
care was conceded, and the further right of the parents to recover for 
the cost of exceptional care after the child reached the age of majority 
was approved in the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bovingdon v Hergott, 
supra note 7. 
34  Supra note 12.  
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system. They will resemble those routinely claimed in a serious 
personal injury case. The costs that the parents will incur are 
apparent and possibly enormous. No caring society should let 
those costs fall where they land by chance, let alone when they 
arise from medical misadventure. The question is not why the 
law allows recovery for the costs of meeting special needs, but 
rather why it does not also compensate the logically identical 
costs of rearing a so-called healthy or normal child.  
 
Several judges have observed, quite properly, that the 
law ought not to distinguish between the worth of a healthy 
child and a child born with a disability. Fortunately, it is not 
necessary to do so. It is an error to describe the results of 
involuntary parenthood in such terms, whether recovery is 
allowed or not. What is in issue is the right to recover damages 
for the cost raising a child. What is not in issue is the value of 
the child. The point is not whether the child was born with a 
disability. The point is not whether the child has a formally 
recognized disability. The point is what it will cost to provide 
the requisite level of care for the child. The basic costs of 
rearing a child will vary according to each child’s needs. It 
costs more to feed, house, clothe and educate some children 
than others. It is superfluous, demeaning and misleading to 
identify the child as having been born with a disability, let 
alone as being disabled, for the purposes of awarding damages 
in an involuntary parenthood action.  
 
One could try to justify the distinction between “basic” 
and “special” child rearing expenses on the basis of quantum. 
The basic costs are surprisingly modest.35 The parents’ 
expenses and the corresponding damage awards are likely to be 
larger, much larger, in the case of special needs. Such a 
distinction would work like catastrophic loss insurance, with a 
large deductible for the cost or rearing a healthy child. 
Arguably this is a rational response to the social problem of 
                                                
35  Infra note 97.  
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involuntary parenthood. But it is not a common law tort, 
corrective justice approach. It is an exceptional approach 
dependent on an unnecessary exercise of discrimination.  
 
One could try to justify the distinction between “basic” 
and “special” child-rearing expenses on the basis of credibility 
in proof of loss. Lax J in Kealey attempts to do this:36 
 
Moreover, to draw a distinction between 
children born with disabilities and those born 
healthy seems wrong. Every life has value. But, 
the financial and emotional burdens imposed on 
parents who are charged with the responsibility 
of caring for a disabled child are far more 
apparent to me than the financial and emotional 
burdens imposed on the Kealeys here. I do not 
think that this is merely a question of the 
measure of damages. Rather, it goes to the 
question of whether or not there is in fact an 
injury to redress. 
 
Evidently, Lax J’s view was that happy families do not 
experience a loss when deprived of their reproductive 
autonomy.  
 
L Millet was perhaps more candid when he expressed 
the following view in Rees:37 
 
A disabled child is not “worth” less than a 
                                                
36  Kealey, supra note 4 at para 97. 
37  McFarlane, supra note 1 at para 112. L Millet did not find it 
necessary to resolve whether parents of children born with disabilities 
should be able to recover their extra costs over and beyond the 
£15,000 conventional sum he awarded to the parent of a healthy 
child. The conventional sum approach is discussed immediately 
below. 
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healthy one. The blessings of his or her birth are 
no less incalculable. Society must equally 
“regard the balance as beneficial.” But the law 
does not develop by strict logic; and most people 
would instinctively feel that there was a 
difference, even if they had difficulty in 
articulating it. Told that a friend has given birth 
to a normal, healthy baby, we would express 
relief as well as joy. Told that she had given 
birth to a seriously disabled child, most of us 
would feel (though not express) sympathy for 
the parents. Our joy at the birth would not be 
unalloyed; it would be tinged with sorrow for 
the child's disability. Speaking for myself, I 
would not find it morally offensive to reflect this 
difference in an award of compensation that the 
birth of a child born with a disability would 
generate. 
 
These remarks appear to transcend the question of 
parental care costs and focus on the injury to the child per se. 
Perhaps L Millet is dealing with what he suspects are the non-
pecuniary detriments of raising a child born with a disability? 
Interestingly, neither he nor anyone else has been prepared to 
consider explicitly the “setoff of benefits” approach in the case 
of children with need for special care.  
 
There is no valid justification for distinguishing care 
costs on the basis of disability. McHugh and Gummow JJ put it 
well in Cattanach:38 
 
The reliance upon values respecting the 
importance of life is made implausible by the 
reference to the postulated child as “healthy.” 
The differential treatment of the worth of the 
                                                
38  Cattanach, supra note 1 at para 78. 
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lives of those with ill health or disabilities has 
been a mark of the societies and political 
regimes we least admire. To prevent recovery in 
respect of one class of child but not the other, by 
reference to a criterion of health, would be to 
discriminate by reference to a distinction 
irrelevant to the object sought to be achieved, 
the award of compensatory damages to the 
parents. 
 
The only purpose served by dividing recoverable 
damages into two categories – child-rearing costs for healthy 
children and child-rearing costs for so-called disabled children 
– is to preserve a rule that denies recovery for the costs of 
rearing a healthy child. The justifications for refusing to 
compensate for the ordinary costs of care are inadequate. If the 
law simply allowed recovery for the costs of rearing any child 
born from an involuntary parenthood, the need to discriminate 
on the ground of disability, however benevolent it may seem, 
would disappear.39  
 
FULL RECOVERY WITHIN THE “AMBIT OF 
WRONGDOING” 
 
There are several judicial approaches to child-rearing damages 
for wrongful pregnancy that give nominal approval to full 
recovery under the basic rules of tort law. However, the “pure 
full recovery” approach has only been approved in two 
                                                
39  Admittedly, the view that nothing should ever be awarded for the cost 
of child-rearing regardless of whether the child is born healthy or 
with a disability is equally logical. For all the reasons given earlier, it 
is also utterly flawed.  
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jurisdictions: Australia40 and New Brunswick.41 In the other 
examples the courts impose limits to full recovery not 
ordinarily employed elsewhere in negligence law.  
 
The “ambit of recovery” line of argument rejects 
“foreseeability” as the standard limiting rule to bound recovery 
for involuntary parenthood. Instead, it posits that claims to 
recover the cost of rearing the child are claims for pure 
economic loss. It concludes that ordinary negligence law 
governing economic loss would employ a different limiting 
rule than foreseeability, and restrict recovery to losses that fell 
within the “ambit of the wrongdoing.” 
 
This “ambit of recovery” approach was first proposed 
by Lax J in Kealey:42 
 
Although courts which have considered 
wrongful pregnancy cases have purported to 
follow ordinary principles of negligence law to 
allow recovery, a closer analysis of the cases 
suggests that, foreseeable or not, damages are by 
                                                
40  Cattanach, supra note 1. The result was subsequently modified by 
legislation in three Australian states, essentially to restrict recovery to 
the extra cost of raising a child born with a disability. See supra note 
12.  
41  Stockford v Johnston Estate, supra note 13. See also MS v Baker, 
supra note 13. The child had serious health problems for the first five 
years, and was healthy thereafter. The court apparently approved full 
recovery applying the scope of the risk test from Kealey, supra note 
4. This was in obiter because the plaintiff failed to establish 
negligence. 
42  This was first approved in Kealey, supra note 4, and followed 
subsequently in Hunter, supra note 14 at para 20; and in Mummery v 
Olsson, [2001] OJ No 226 [Mummery]. It was approved by L Scott in 
Rees, supra note 1 at para 145, but rejected in the same case by L 
Millet at para 112. 
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and large awarded when the plaintiff is within 
the ambit of the defendant's wrongdoing. By this 
I mean that the consequences of the failed 
sterilization causes [sic] an actual impairment to 
the interest which the sterilization sought to 
protect. In my view, this is evident from each of 
the seminal wrongful pregnancy cases resulting 
in the birth of a healthy child in the United 
States, England and Canada. 
 
According to this line of argument, a mother who had 
undergone a failed sterilization might recover the cost of 
rearing a healthy child if the purpose of sterilization had been 
to protect her from the economic consequences of pregnancy.43 
On the other hand, a mother who sought sterilization to avoid a 
child being born with a hereditary disease would not, on this 
theory, have suffered any loss if the child were born without 
the disease.44  
 
The “ambit of the wrongdoing” approach from Kealey 
has been employed in Ontario to permit recovery of 
exceptional extra care costs in the case of children born with 
                                                
43  See also MS v Baker, supra note 13.  
44  This example was used by Chamberland J in the Court of Appeal in 
Suite c Cooke, [1993] RJQ 514, 15 CCLT (2d) 15 (Sup Ct), aff’d 
[1995] RJQ 2765 (CA); and quoted in Kealey, supra note 4 at para 
75. In Kealey at para 89 the court said: 
 I wish to make clear that the result in this case does not finally 
determine whether, in all cases, damages for child- rearing costs 
are or are not recoverable. This is not a case where a sterilization 
was sought to protect a mother's health and the mother became 
ill, impairing her ability to care for the child. Nor is it a case 
where a sterilization was sought to avoid the transmission of a 
hereditary condition and the child was born diseased. This is not 
a case of economic necessity, imposing unreasonable financial 
burdens on an impoverished family.  
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disabilities,45 and to refuse recovery in the case of a healthy 
child.46 It was explicitly adopted in the 2008 New Brunswick 
decision in Stockford v. Johnston Estate to allow the cost of 
raising a healthy child.47  It has not found favour elsewhere in 
Canada, or in the UK or Australia. 
There are practical shortcomings with the “ambit of the 
wrongdoing” approach. How will the court ever discover the 
parents’ true motive after the fact, if indeed there was any 
common single motive? Self-serving, often unverifiable 
testimony is inevitable, from the parents and the defendants. 
The prospect of distasteful and symbolically damaging 
testimony is a legitimate concern. Similar reasons underlie the 
reason for rejecting a purely subjective test of causation in 
medical malpractice cases.48 
 
It is probable that financial considerations will be one 
consideration among several in involuntary pregnancy cases. A 
liberal interpretation of what degree of financial motivation 
will meet the ambit of the wrongdoing test could render the 
restriction relatively meaningless. The approach in Kealey 
raises the opposite concern. Lax J’s judgment would seem to 
require the law to distinguish between the “impoverished”49 
                                                
45  Hunter, supra note 14 at para 20. Liability was based on a failure to 
refer the mother to a genetic consultation. The children were born 
with multiple sclerosis. The total damage award was almost $3m, 
almost $2m for the cost of child rearing. It is unclear whether by 
following Kealey the court in Hunter was adopting the “within the 
ambit of the wrongdoing” approach, or simply allowing the 
exceptional costs of care as recoverable regardless. 
46  Mummery, supra note 42. Although it was not an issue in Bovingdon, 
supra note 7, the facts are consistent with the ambit of the 
wrongdoing test.  
47  Supra note 13. 
48  Reibl v Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880. 
49  Kealey, supra note 4 at para 89. 
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parents who may recover and the middle class parents who 
may not.50  Rules based explicitly on ad hoc considerations of 
distributive justice are rare in the common law of torts where 
corrective justice usually carries the day. It is curious how they 
seem to trump corrective justice in involuntary parenthood 
cases.51  
 
There are also doctrinal objections to the “ambit of the 
wrongdoing” approach. Most fundamentally is the 
characterization of the claim as one for “economic loss.” Here 
we may run into an aversion to calling a pregnancy an “injury” 
or a “loss.” However, it is difficult to imagine a more 
fundamental interference with the primary right to personal 
autonomy and integrity that negligence law protects.52  An 
unwanted pregnancy is a clear example of a physical as 
opposed to an economic intrusion.53 The cost of raising a child 
born of an unwanted pregnancy is a consequential economic 
loss, consequential on physical interference. It is not a pure 
economic loss. Foreseeability, not ambit of the wrongdoing, is 
the proper test in such cases. 
 
Even if one were to describe the claim as one for pure 
economic loss, which it is not, the ambit of the wrongdoing 
approach cannot be justified doctrinally. The approach to 
economic loss that attracted Lax J is specific to negligent 
                                                
50  Lifestyle choices are not respected under this approach. 
51  Consider also the concern that liability for ordinary child rearing 
costs might damage the National Health Services expressed by Kirby 
J in Cattanach, supra note 1 at para 178 and approved by L Bingham 
in Rees, supra note 1 at para 6. The amounts at issue are unlikely to 
bankrupt any national health service. Nor is a case made for why the 
mothers have to subsidize the National Health Service.  
52  See Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2007) at ch 2. 
53  Ibid, at ch 12. 
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misrepresentation, a cause of action with a very different 
foundation than medical malpractice or other types of 
economic loss claims.54 The judge was inspired by an excellent 
article written by Professor Chapman analysing a rule of law 
established in Canada’s leading negligent misrepresentation 
case involving pure economic loss, Hercules Management v. 
Ernst & Young.55 The defendants were employed by a 
corporation to prepare corporate audits as required under 
statute. Shareholders of the corporation foreseeably relied on 
the negligently prepared statements to make private investment 
decisions. Although the court recognized sufficient proximity 
based on this reasonable foreseeability, liability was denied at 
the second stage of the Anns framework because of the 
possibility of indeterminate liability. The court adopted what is 
sometimes called the “end and aim” rule to restrict the scope of 
recovery in misrepresentation to losses suffered within the 
context of the purpose for which the report was given. The 
corporation itself was therefore owed a duty of care. The duty 
did not extend to individual shareholders’ private investment 
decisions. Courts in other jurisdictions would employ the “end 
and aim” test at the proximity stage to define the type of 
relationship that would support the duty.56 Although not its 
purpose when employed as part of the proximity analysis, the 
                                                
54  The duty in misrepresentation is based on the defendant’s assumption 
of responsibility and the plaintiff’s reliance, and not governed by 
Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] AC 462. Some wrongful birth cases, 
but not all, can be explained under both approaches. See Gordon T 
Houseman, “Wrongful Birth as Negligent Misrepresentation” (2013), 
71 UT Fac L Rev 9. The reliance-based duties in misrepresentation 
derived from Hedley Byrne v Heller, [1964] AC 465 are entirely 
different from those at the heart of other claims for pure economic 
loss. See Beever, supra note 52 at ch 12.  
55  Hercules Management v Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 SCR 165. 
56  Caparo v Dickman, [1990] UKHL 2, [1990] 2 AC 605; and Esanda 
Finance Corp v Peat Markwick Hungerfords (1997), 188 CLR 241, 
[1997] HCA 8. 
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“end and aim rule” effectively eliminates the potential for 
indeterminate liability.  
 
Neither proximity nor indeterminacy is problematic in 
an involuntary parenthood case. The issues present in Hercules 
bear no relationship to those in an involuntary parenthood case. 
The type of indeterminacy that has concerned some judges in 
involuntary parenthood cases, if it really is an indeterminacy 
problem at all, is not addressed by an “ambit of the 
wrongdoing” test.57 In addition, the duty in misrepresentation is 
one that the defendant voluntarily assumes and ought therefore 
to be restricted to precisely what duty was assumed. Even if 
one could argue that the duty in an involuntary parenthood case 
was voluntarily assumed, the duty so assumed would be 
assumed to the mother, and would be the duty to prevent 
pregnancy or birth. Preventing pregnancy or birth was the “end 
and aim” of the medical service. The cost of raising the child 
falls precisely within the ambit of the wrongdoing. The 
mother’s motives are irrelevant.58 The mother’s position is 
analogous to the corporation that commissioned the audit in 
Hercules, not to the third party shareholders seeking to take 
advantage of a service provided to others for a different 
purpose.  
 
Foreseeability is the limiting concept in ordinary 
negligence law. Even if the involuntary parenthood claim were 
                                                
57  In Cattanach, supra note 1 at paras 30-39 Gleeson J develops the 
indeterminacy argument derived from the fact that a family might 
claim damages for a broad range of items including gifts, weddings, 
university education, and so on. The “ambit of wrongdoing” limit 
does not address this concern. Gleeson’s examples illustrate more of a 
potential problem of rule imprecision than of indeterminacy. The 
same potential problem could exist in any future care assessment in a 
serious personal injury case, and the courts have developed guidelines 
to address it. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.  
58  See L Millet in McFarlane, supra note 1 at 1003.  
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described as one for pure economic loss, that does not in and of 
itself change this. There is no functional or doctrinal 
justification for replacing foreseeability with an “ambit of the 
wrongdoing” approach in an involuntary parenthood case.  
   
OFFSETTING BENEFITS 
 
On the surface, the “offsetting benefits” position is the opposite 
of the inherent “value of life” position. Courts that adopt the 
offset position purport to accept that the plaintiffs are entitled 
to full compensation for the cost of child rearing. However, 
they set off the inherent benefit of raising a child. Although not 
inevitable, in practice such courts assume that these benefits 
meet or exceed the cost of raising a healthy child.59 They 
therefore award nothing for the costs of raising a healthy child. 
Damages for the extra exceptional cost of raising a child who 
has special needs may, however, be compensable. Those who 
take the “offsetting benefits” position arrive by a different route 
at the same place as members of the “inherent value of life” 
school of thought. It is not certain that they do so for different 
reasons.  
 
The “offsetting benefits” approach is another example 
of employing a legal rule in an involuntary parenthood case 
that is not used in standard negligence law. The benefits of 
raising a child are largely non-pecuniary.60 By definition they 
                                                
59  Quebec is a firm adherent to this approach. See Cataford c Moreau, 
[1978] JQ no 302, 114 DLR (3d) 585 (Sup Ct); and Suite c Cooke, 
supra note 44. The approach was rejected in Kealey, supra note 4 but 
the court would have assessed the net benefit at zero had it adopted it. 
According to L Bingham in Rees, supra note 1, no judge favoured the 
net benefit approach in either McFarlane, supra note 1 or in 
Cattanach, supra note 1. 
60  There may be pecuniary benefits such as government support related 
to child-rearing. None of the objections to offsetting non-pecuniary 
benefits apply to these. One should insist only that these collateral 
benefits are treated like collateral benefits in other cases, unless a 
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cannot be measured accurately in money, even assuming 
perfect information. A court may assign a monetary value to a 
non-pecuniary benefit or loss, but the figure must be arbitrary 
given the nature of the loss. In contrast, the costs of raising a 
child are pecuniary. They may be difficult to quantify 
accurately and fairly, perhaps particularly so in an involuntary 
parenthood case, but in theory it can be done.61 The law ought 
not to offset pecuniary losses with non-pecuniary benefits. Like 
should be offset against like. The law does not offset an award 
for lost earning capacity against the assumed joy of 
unemployed leisure.62 The law would not reduce pecuniary 
damages awarded under Fatal Accidents legislation if there 
were evidence that the late husband was a nasty individual who 
made his wife's life miserable.63 No precedent for offsetting 
pecuniary damages with non-pecuniary benefits in negligence 
has ever been cited in an involuntary parenthood case.  
 
The conclusion that every child constitutes a net 
benefit to parents is false. At best, it is an unproven 
generalization. Every child does not generate “. . . innumerable 
benefits in the form of personal satisfaction and happiness . . 
.”64 for every parent. Pretending otherwise does not make it so. 
Some unwilling parents will have chosen originally not to have 
an additional child precisely because they anticipated that 
another child would not bring them much joy. A fictional 
                                                                                           
compelling case for deviating from the general rule is made. See 
Stockford, supra note 13 where it is assumed that deducting pecuniary 
benefits is a simple exercise of the collateral source rule.  
61  This is a legitimate concern, discussed infra in the text accompanying 
notes 94-97. 
62  See Cattanach, supra note 1 per McHugh & Gummow JJ at paras 85-
90. This was criticized unconvincingly by Gleason CJ at para 37. 
63  Stockford, supra note 13 at para 107. 
64  Kealey, supra note 4 at para 82. Contra see J Ellis Cameron-Perry, 
“Return of the burden of the ‘blessing’” (1999), 149 NLJ 1887.  
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public transit passenger might think such parents misguided or 
worse. But this is a lawful choice. The parents are better-placed 
than the courts to assess the net benefits to them of having an 
additional child. Then too, there are the children who “only a 
mother could love.” Parents may love their children without 
experiencing much parental satisfaction or happiness. They 
may not love their child at all. 
 
In theory, these problems might be addressed by 
evidence. Courts do assess non-pecuniary damages and the 
amounts awarded could be informed by evidence of 
comparative loss. The same could be done with non-pecuniary 
benefits. In several Canadian cases, when declining to 
compensate for the cost of raising a child, the courts have 
observed that the parents were in fact experiencing the joys of 
child rearing.65 None have yet to deal with a parent testifying 
that the child brought no joy, a realistic possibility, although it 
would be distasteful and potentially damaging to the child. The 
courts understandably do not want to adopt a rule that 
encourages parents to give self-serving and symbolically 
unattractive testimony that might well harm the child. More 
fundamentally, if the law were to begin to refine the 
quantification of the joys of parenthood, the law would be 
treating a child, and for that matter, human life, like a 
commodity. No court has ever indicated a desire to do so.  
 
Most judges are aware of the legitimate difficulties of 
attempting to quantify the value of parental satisfaction and joy 
in individual cases. However, the decisions to refuse to 
                                                
65  This seems to have been the dominant reason for denying care 
damages in Kealey, supra note 4. Cf. Fredette v Wiebe (1986) 4 
BCLR (2d) 184, 29 DLR (4th) 534, a case in which the mother 
testified she would have wanted a child eventually, just not at the 
time when she was a teenaged single mother. The reasons are unclear 
but she may have recovered pecuniary damages, and did recover non-
pecuniary damages, related to the accelerated birth. 
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compensate because of the impossibility of quantifying, or to 
simply assume that the benefits exceed or offset the cost of 
raising the child, do not follow logically from these 
difficulties.66 The pecuniary costs of child rearing can be 
quantified as accurately in these cases as in standard personal 
injury cases. The quantification difficulties arise from the 
offsetting approach, not from the damages claim itself. The 
logical solution is to follow the ordinary rules of negligence 
law and to abandon entirely the futile attempt to offset non-
pecuniary benefits. 
It is interesting to speculate as to why some judges 
conclude that the impossibility of making the offset approach 
work justifies an assumption that there is a net benefit to child 
rearing, as opposed to a perfect set-up or net loss. Perhaps they 
believe that the benefits of child rearing should always 
outweigh the costs, and that the state ought not to support 
parents who feel otherwise. The offsetting benefits approach 
could be employed in an effort to justify that decision. The 
similarity to the inherent value of life school of thought is 
evident in such an approach. Another possibility is that some 
judges sincerely believe that the benefits of raising a child 
always do in fact outweigh the costs. They would then have a 
sincere belief in the risk of over-compensation.67 The question 
remains why such a speculative and unquantifiable “risk” is 
considered a more serious problem than ignoring patient 
                                                
66  There are two variants of the argument. One is that there is a net 
benefit. This is the Quebec approach. See supra note 60. The other is 
that the impossibility of making the calculation in itself justifies 
denying the claim. See eg L Millet in Rees, supra note 1 at para 111 
taking issue with Lady Hales’ “deemed equilibrium” concept in 
McFarlane, supra note 1. 
67  This explanation is easier to reconcile with the otherwise illogical 
decision to allow recovery for extra exceptional care costs related to 
raising a child born with a disability, but not allowing for basic costs 
of raising a child born healthy. See above section “Only Exceptional 
Care Costs Allowed for Child Born with a Disability” at p 17.  
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choice, under-compensating parents, and under-deterring 
medical malpractice.  
 
DUTY TO MITIGATE: ABORTION AND ADOPTION 
 
Reproductive freedom could be a two-edged sword. If a 
woman becomes pregnant against her wishes she will 
sometimes, depending on local access problems, have the 
option of undergoing a safe abortion. Of course the law cannot 
require her to do so, but a few judges have observed that a 
failure to abort or place the child for adoption could constitute 
a failure to mitigate damages.68  
It is understandable that no Canadian court has actually 
recognized a duty to mitigate by abortion or adoption. In other 
contexts, tort law is reluctant to impose duties to mitigate that 
interfere with legitimate rights to make personal choices.69 
Duties to mitigate are usually employed in a business context.70 
A duty to mitigate by abortion is a particularly dangerous line 
of argument. Abortion is an intensely personal matter. Few 
judges, and certainly those who are in the “inherent value of 
human life” school of thought, would wish the law to develop 
rules that effectively and symbolically promoted abortion as 
                                                
68  See e.g. Keats v Pearce [1984] NJ No 271, 48 Nfld & PEIR 102; and 
Kealey, supra note 4 at para 87. In Leek v Vaidyanathan, 2011 ONCA 
46, the court declined to resolve the question on a preliminary motion 
holding a trial record was required to consider the question.  
69  See e.g. the discussion on limits to the duty to mitigate in the context 
of catastrophic injury in Canada’s leading personal injury damages 
decision, Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta,[1978] 2 SCR 229 
[Andrews] 
70  In a personal injury case the plaintiff must mitigate by making a 
rational treatment choice, Janiak v Ippolito, [1985] 1 SCR 146. The 
failure to terminate a pregnancy or place for adoption is unlikely to be 
regarded as irrational.  
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birth control.71 A requirement to mitigate by placing the child 
for adoption avoids some of the abortion baggage. But it too 
would thrust the court unnecessarily into the volatile and value-
laden relationships amongst the state, women, and families.72  
Finally, such a duty to mitigate would apply to 
damages related to the pregnancy and birth itself, and also to 
damages for the extra costs of raising a child born with a 
disability. The duty to mitigate by abortion or adoption would 
effectively eliminate entirely the action for involuntary 
parenthood. Experience has shown us that few judges are 
inclined to go that far.  
 
CONVENTIONAL SUMS AND NON-PECUNIARY 
DAMAGES 
 
In 1999, the UK House of Lords (“UKHL”) held unanimously 
                                                
71  The case for imposing a duty to mitigate by abortion may appear 
stronger in wrongful birth cases which themselves arise from 
negligently performed abortions. It might seem more difficult for a 
mother in such a case to argue, for example, that she had principled 
objections to abortion. This line of reasoning is false. There is no 
factual basis to distinguish someone who has once elected an abortion 
from someone who has not. See Fredette, supra note 65.  
72  In McFarlane, supra note 1 L Steyn said:  
 I cannot conceive of any circumstances in which the autonomous 
decision of the parents not to resort to even a lawful abortion 
could be questioned. For similar reasons the parents' decision not 
to have the child adopted was plainly natural and commendable. 
It is difficult to envisage any circumstances in which it would be 
right to challenge such a decision of the parents. The starting 
point is the right of parents to make decisions on family planning 
and, if those plans fail, their right to care for an initially 
unwanted child. The law does and must respect these decisions 
of parents which are so closely tied to their basic freedoms and 
rights of personal autonomy.  
 See also Rees, supra note 1 at para 136 per L Scott.  
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in McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board that the cost of rearing a 
healthy child was not recoverable.73 In 2001, the EWCA held 
in Parkinson v. St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS 
Trust that the mother could recover the additional costs of 
raising a child born with severe disabilities.74 Parkinson was 
not appealed. In 2003, the UKHL decided Rees v. Darlington 
Memorial Hospital NHS Trust.75 Rees arose from a failed 
sterilization undergone by a mother who had a serious visual 
disability. She believed she would not be able to properly 
parent a child should she give birth to one. Her child was born 
healthy. The seven Lords in Rees unanimously affirmed the 
decision in McFarlane to disallow claims for the cost of 
rearing a healthy child.76  
 
The holding in Parkinson was not in issue in Rees. 
Nevertheless, the majority in Rees seems to have supported the 
right to recover additional special care costs.77 Three of the 
seven Lords would have distinguished Rees from McFarlane 
and allowed the mother to recover the cost of raising a healthy 
child.78 A majority of four would not allow the mother to 
                                                
73  Supra note 1. 
74  Supra note 18. 
75  Supra note 1. 
76  As will be evident from what follows, the impact of McFarlane, 
supra note 1, is now mitigated because the mother will be entitled to 
a £15,000 conventional sum according to the decision in Rees, supra 
note 1 .  
77  Rees, supra note 1 per L Steyn at para 35, L Hope at para 57, L 
Hutton and para 91, and possibly L Scott at para 147. L Millet did not 
find it necessary to decide. Strictly speaking, the holding in 
Parkinson, supra note 18 was not at issue in Rees. L Bingham at para 
8 and L Nichols at para 18 would not permit recovery for the extra 
costs of care.  
78  Rees, supra note 1 per L Steyn at para 48, per L Hope at para 78 & 
per L Hutton at para 98.  
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recover her pecuniary damages. This majority held that the 
mother was entitled instead to recover a “conventional sum” of 
£15,000 in recognition of the damage to her reproductive 
autonomy.79 Two of those four would have preferred to 
overrule Parkinson had that decision been in issue. They 
favoured awarding only that conventional sum in all cases, 
regardless of whether the claim was for ordinary child rearing 
expenses, or for exceptional expenses related to special needs.80  
L Bingham described the conventional award as follows:81 
 
This solution is in my opinion consistent with 
the ruling and rationale of McFarlane. The 
conventional award would not be, and would not 
be intended to be, compensatory. It would not be 
the product of calculation. But it would not be a 
nominal, let alone a derisory, award. It would 
afford some measure of recognition of the wrong 
done. And it would afford a more ample 
measure of justice than the pure McFarlane rule. 
 
It is difficult to regard the conventional sum approach 
as anything other than an attempt to find a compromise 
amongst the strongly competing positions found in the 
involuntary parenthood case law.82 There is nothing inherently 
                                                
79  Rees, supra note 1 per L Bingham at para 8, per L Nichols at para 17, 
per L Millet at para 125, & per L Scott at para 148. 
80  Rees, supra note 1, per L Bingham at para 9, & per L Nicholls at para 
18. 
81  Rees, supra note 1 at para 8. 
82  The HL has never been keen to reverse its previous decisions. 
McFarlane, supra note 1 had been decided only a few years earlier. 
Subsequent to the arguments, but before the decision in Rees, supra 
note 1, the majority of the HC of Australia had rejected McFarlane in 
Cattanach, supra note 1. L Steyn at para 46 made it clear he regarded 
the conventional sum approach as an attempt to circumvent 
McFarlane. 
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wrong with compromise, provided it is scrutinized as such. In 
assessing this compromise it is important to keep in mind what 
L Steyn called the “heterodox nature of the proposed 
solution”83 and to recall the concern expressed earlier about 
deviating from ordinary tort rules, especially when doing so 
has a discriminatory impact. 
 
On the surface, awarding a conventional sum appears 
to be a win-win solution. The mother’s right to reproductive 
autonomy was symbolically affirmed in eloquent prose by L 
Bingham. It was recognized with an award of damages. Those 
who believe that the birth of a child can never be the subject of 
damages should also be satisfied. This approach severs 
completely the mother’s recovery from the cost of rearing the 
child. This is what Rees really stands for. 
 
The problem is that the mother was not fully 
compensated. Indeed, the UKHL would not even admit that she 
was entitled to compensation. And as discussed earlier, the 
inherent value of life argument does not logically support 
limiting the mother’s claim in the first place.  
 
There seem to be only two senses in which this can be 
called a “win-win” situation. The first is to regard it as a fresh 
approach to the setoff exercise. The court would be recognizing 
that there is a net cost to raising a healthy child. What would be 
new is that setoff of non-pecuniary benefits would be less than 
the full cost of care. No one in Rees supported the conventional 
award on this basis. The setoff approach is inherently flawed. 
Adjusting the arbitrary numbers does not change this. 
 
Alternatively, this conventional sum could be called a 
“win” on purely pragmatic grounds. Mothers would have to 
accept that whatever the merits of their claim, this is as good as 
it is going to get. Something is better than nothing. Although it 
                                                
83  See Rees, supra note 1 per L Steyn at para 45. 
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is far less than the cost of raising a healthy child, £15,000 is not 
a derisory sum. 
 
Pragmatic compromise is the essence of tort law. The 
overwhelming majority of cases are settled one way or another. 
There was nothing stopping the parties in Rees from settling for 
£15,000. However, a judicially imposed compromise of this 
sort is unheard of. As L Steyn pointed out, there is no authority 
for adopting the conventional sum approach in the UK or 
elsewhere.84 Judicial decisions are not compromises, in legal 
theory or in fact. The principled application of legal rules may 
well result in each party achieving something. The defendant 
may be found negligent, but recovery reduced because the 
plaintiff’s own negligence contributes to the loss, for example. 
That is quite different from a court adopting a rule that 
effectively tries to give something to everyone because the 
judges cannot agree on who is entitled to what.  
 
In Rees, L Hope raised a different objection to the 
conventional sum approach. He explained the role of 
conventional sums in assessing claims for general damages in 
UK law. Some damages are not capable of monetary 
quantification so conventional sums are used to establish a 
comparative, if arbitrary, scale of loss.85 He then pointed out 
that the effect of the conventional sum approach in Rees was to 
reject the quantifiable claims for special damages and allow 
recovery only for the non-quantifiable general damages.86 This 
                                                
84  Rees, supra note 1 at para 46. He also felt it was impermissible for a 
court to adopt this solution. 
85  One problem with this critique is that a fixed conventional sum for 
each case eliminates the comparative injury approach which is the 
very reason for conventional awards according to L Hope. 
86  Rees, supra note 1 at paras 70-74. 
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he found objectionable.87 It is not certain that L Bingham 
would have accepted this description of his conventional sum 
solution, let alone intended it. It does appear, however, that this 
is exactly what the courts of British Columbia have done. 
 
A remarkable thing happened in British Columbia on 
July 14 and July 15, 2004. Decisions in Bevilacqua v. 
Altenkirk,88 and then in Roe v. Dabbs,89 were released in the 
Supreme Court by two different judges. Both were involuntary 
parenthood decisions involving claims for the cost of rearing a 
healthy child. Neither decision was referred to in the other. By 
striking coincidence, the novel reasons for judgment in each 
were virtually identical.  
 
Both judges held that the parents were entitled to 
compensation, but that the cost of raising a healthy child was 
not a true measure of the loss. Rather, the parents were to be 
compensated for their non-pecuniary losses flowing from the 
involuntary parenthood. Significantly, both judges were 
convinced that awarding the cost of care without offsetting the 
non-pecuniary benefits would over-compensate the parents.90 
                                                
87  The point would have to be made differently in Canada. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has eliminated the various types of general damages 
that L Hope was describing. Instead, it established a global head of 
non-pecuniary loss capped at $100,000 in 1978 CAD. The court also 
rejected the comparative loss criterion for determining the amount. 
Instead, non-pecuniary damages were supposed to be quantified 
based on the plaintiff’s need for solace. See Andrews, supra note 69. 
88  Supra note 11. 
89  Roe v Dabbs, 2004 BCSC 957, [2004] BCJ No 1485. 
90  Bevilacqua, supra note 11 at para 115; Roe, ibid at 196-201. 
Certainly there was no over-compensation in the end result. In Roe, 
after looking at damage awards in similar cases (which were assessed 
on different bases) the court awarded $55,000 in non-pecuniary 
damages to the mother. Making similar comparisons in Bevilacqua, 
the court awarded “. . . $30,000 to Mrs. Bevilacqua, the bulk of 
Suppressing Damages in Involuntary Parenthood Actions 49 
However, they both recognized the practical difficulties with 
the offset approach.  
 
In denying pecuniary damages, the BC courts reasoned 
that the cost of rearing a healthy child did not constitute a loss, 
but rather a redistribution of family resources. In their opinion, 
the family does not have fewer resources after the tort. They 
believe that the negligence merely redistributes resources 
among family members to account for the costs occasioned by 
the new child. It is true that an unplanned child does not 
necessarily reduce family income.91 It increases family 
expenses. This is a loss. This line of argument does not 
advance the case for denying recovery one bit. It is simply a 
more cumbersome, if apparently more orthodox method of 
seeking compromise than the conventional sum approach. 
 
In fairness, in Bevilacqua Globerman J does an 
excellent job of raising different, but related and legitimate 
concerns. 92 It is true that the amount that a parent may elect to 
spend on rearing a child is determined in part by parental 
choice about how to allocate family resources. Some parents 
may see university education as a necessity and others not. The 
law cannot regard unconstrained parental choice as the basis 
upon which to quantify damages caused by the tortfeasor. 
There must be some objective test or measure to control for 
this.  
 
One possible solution could be to adopt the "Actual 
                                                                                           
which would be to compensate her for pregnancy and childbirth” and 
$20,000 to the father, “primarily to compensate him for the 
readjustments he has had to make in response to the financial burdens 
of providing for [the child].” Supra note 11 at 214 
91  This ignores the reduction in income incurred if one or both parents 
reduce their earnings to make time to care for the child.  
92  Supra note 9 at paras 124-143. 
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Anticipated Expenditure” approach. This could rely on 
aggregate data about what level of expenditure a family of a 
particular size with a particular income typically spends on 
raising an additional child.93 Such a combination of objective 
and subjective measure of loss is not unknown in personal 
injury cases.94 It is also true, however, that the AAE approach 
favours wealthier parents who may elect to devote more 
resources to rearing a child than those parents who lack the 
resources to do so. At some point the elusive line between loss 
and investment benefit becomes of concern. There is much to 
be said for limiting recovery by some objective measure 
independent of family wealth. Of course, there is much to be 
said for that in other areas of tort law as well. 
 
The solution to these difficulties according to the 
decisions in Bevilacqua and Roe is to deny the claim for 
pecuniary loss altogether and to award modest amounts for 
non-pecuniary damages. This was correctly criticized by L 
Hope in Rees.95 It under-compensates the plaintiffs. It allows 
the court to pull a number out of a hat with no foundation, and 
leaves no objective basis for an appeal as to quantum. It 
employs a comparative loss approach to non-pecuniary 
damages that has been rejected by the Supreme Court of 
Canada.96 There is a better way. The courts could employ data 
about what the average Canadian family of a certain size 
regardless of income would spend rearing an additional child. 
Or, the courts could adopt an evidence-based conventional sum 
to compensate for the pecuniary cost of raising a child. Either 
of these solutions would address the legitimate quantification 
                                                
93  Bevilacqua, supra note 9 at para 124. 
94  For example, in Andrews, supra note 69, the court used government 
data to determine what percentage of income the average Canadian 
spent on basic necessities.  
95  Rees, supra note 1 at paras 70-74. 
96  Andrews, supra note 69. 
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difficulties, and reduce the need for costly, unreliable expert 
evidence. The actual awards for the ordinary costs of rearing a 




Only a single Canadian court has yet approved recovery in an 
involuntary parenthood case for the full cost of raising a 
child.98 Other Canadian courts have adopted no fewer than five 
different rules to limit such damages. The uncertainty in the 
law is unacceptable. In each of the limiting cases the damage 
limit was exceptional in that no such limit is employed in any 
other area of negligence law. As such, in each case the damage 
limit discriminates against parents, particularly mothers. These 
limits effectively require parents to subsidize medical 
malpractice.  
                                                
97  For example, in Cattanach, supra note 1 the parents were granted 
about $100,000 CAD for child rearing. See Gleeson CJ at para 17. In 
Kealey, supra note 4, had the court recognized the claims, child 
rearing costs would have been assessed at about $140,000. 
Christopher Sarlo argues that it is possible to raise a child on about 
$3,000-$4,000 a year, and even less if parents only include necessary 
expenses and are careful with their dollars. Christopher A Sarlo, The 
Cost of Raising Children, online: The Fraser Institute < 
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/ 
research-news/research/publications/MeasuringCostChildren.pdf>. 
Sarlo’s estimates do not include the cost of child care. Other 
estimates run between $10,000 and $20,000/ year depending on 
several variables. See e.g. United States Department of Agriculture, 
USDA Cost of Raising a Child Calculator, online: USDA Center for 
Nutrition Policy and Promotion <http://www.cnpp.usda.gov>. Paul 
Henman, Updated Costs of Raising Children – September Quarter 
2012, (The University of Queensland: Social Policy Unit, School of 
Social Work and Human Services) estimated the total costs at about 
$200,000 AUD. To date there is no clear position about an 
entitlement to damages for losses incurred by a parent choosing to 
leave the workforce to care for the child.  
98 Stockford, supra note 13. 
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The more interesting question is how the law ever 
developed as it did, contorting one accepted rule of negligence 
law after another. There are legitimate concerns about how to 
measure the costs of child care, and more fundamentally about 
whether these costs are a proper measure of damages. But most 
of these difficulties are not unique to involuntary parenthood 
cases, and others are amenable to ready solution. They do not 
warrant denying or drastically restricting the parents’ claims. 
Instead the “solutions” have proven worse than the initial 
concerns. Parents should be entitled to recover the foreseeable 
costs of raising any child born in an involuntary parenthood 
situation, subject to an appropriate limiting principle to reflect 
the fact that parents cannot be allowed to effectively determine 
their own subjective standard of child care. 
 
There is no denying that some judges do not accept 
that a woman has a right to reproductive freedom, a right to not 
have a child. Nor do some accept that this right should be 
protected by ordinary negligence law. Involuntary parenthood 
actions seem too often to provide another opportunity for 
opponents and proponents of reproductive freedom to stage 
real and symbolic battles. So far, the mothers, the fathers and 
their children are losing to the medical profession. What an odd 
script. 
 
The child awards in the typical involuntary parenthood 
case are likely to be too small to justify an unsuccessful party 
in mounting an appeal.99 The stakes in a defective birth control 
pill class action will more than justify either side pursuing 
appeals, even to the Supreme Court if they get leave. There is 
no reason that the ultimate judicial rulings on damages for the 
cost of raising a child will differ in the class actions from in the 
malpractice cases. There is a reasonable prospect that the 
appellate courts will finally endorse a standard tort law 
approach to damages for child care in involuntary parenthood 
                                                
99  Supra note 97. 
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actions. However, the Australian experience shows us that the 
issue may not ultimately be settled by the courts. The same 
arguments that have been raised against full recovery in the 
courts may arise again in the legislatures. In addition, as in 
Australia, we may see a legislative determination to protect 
product manufacturers, especially pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, from the consequences of their negligence.100 
                                                
100  Supra note 12. 
